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 Learning, as a wonder weapon  
of endogenous growth? 
 
Péter Mihályi 
 
Abstract 
 
This extended book review of Creating a Learning Society by Joseph Stiglitz and Bruce 
Greenwald (2014) looks at the 700-page long scholarly work from a transition economy 
perspective.   Using as a starting point Arrow’s renowned concept of “learning by doing”, the 
authors throw away the doctrines of free trade, liberalization of capital, as well as the 
liberalization of labour and currency markets (for short: the Washington consensus) by 
claiming that these policies imped economy-wide learning.    In the opinion of the present 
author, Stiglitz and his co-author are using the term “learning” in such a broad sense that it 
becomes almost meaningless as an explanatory factor in their endogenous growth concept 
thought out primarily for less developed (infant) economies. 
 
 
Keywords: Infant industry, infant economy, learning, labour productivity, inertia, rivalry, 
Washington consensus 
 
JEL numbers: E61, E71, F12, I26, I28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
Lehet-e a tanulás egy endogén  
növekedési modell csodafegyvere? 
 
Mihályi Péter 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Ez a tanulmány tekinthető akár úgy is, mint egy speciális, a posztszocialista átmenet 
szemszögéből készült, hosszúra nyúlt könyvbírálat Joseph Stiglitz és Bruce Greenwald (SG) 
közel 700 oldalas könyvéről (A tanuló társadalom megteremtése. A növekedés, a fejlődés és 
a társadalmi haladás kérdéseinek új megközelítése. Angol és magyar nyelvű kiadás: 2014 és 
2016).   A két amerikai szerző, J. K. Arrow „termeléssel szerzett tudás” fogalmából kiindulva 
arra a következtetésre jutott, hogy a fejlődő, az élbolyhoz képesti lemaradás behozni kívánó 
országok számára a növekedés legfontosabb útja, módja és csatornája a tanulás, legfőbb 
akadálya pedig a szabad piacok fékező, bénító hatása.  Elgondolásuk szerint a tanulás azért 
fontos, mert tovagyűrűző pozitív externáliákat generál.   E tanulmány szerzőjének véleménye 
szerint SG olyan lazán és tágan használják a „tanulás” fogalmát, hogy az valójában túlságosan 
sok mindent, s így tulajdonképpen semmit sem jelent, amit modellszerűen értelmezni 
lehetne.   Jelen tanulmány szerzőjének véleménye szerint a fejlődő országok sikereit nem a 
szabad piaci működés – konkrétabban: a washingtoni konszenzus ajánlásai szerinti 
gazdaságpolitika – fékezi, hanem a prekapitalista társadalmak belső értékrendszere, illetve 
azok az intézmények, amelyek egy privilegizált hazai kisebbség érdekei szerint elnyomják a 
változásban érdekelt többséget. 
 
 
Kulcsszavak: fejlődő iparágak, felzárkózó országok, tanulás, munkatermelékenység, 
tehetetlenség, versengés, washingtoni konszenzus 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Personally, it makes me contented to see that thick theoretical books are now coming into 
fashion in economics once again.   In the recent past, the first in the sequence was Daron 
Acemoglu and James A. Robinson’s (2012) monograph - Why Nations Fail: The Origins of 
Power, Prosperity, and Poverty – with 529 pages. Then came, with 703 pages, the blockbuster 
work of Piketty (2014).  The joint work of Joseph E. Stiglitz and Bruce C. Greenwald 
(henceforth: S&G), the subject of the present paper, has a length of 660 pages.  One can, of 
course, make ironical estimations about the percentage of buyers of these books who really 
read them from cover-to-cover, but the sheer size of these works open the possibility of a 
broad and deep discussion among those deeply committed specialists who did read this long 
book thoroughly.  Social and economic issues are always multi-faceted.   There is no such 
thing as a one-factor explanation.   When complex and controversial issues, like inequality in 
the case of Piketty or the learning as the main driver of development in the case of S&G are 
analysed at this length, this opens the possibility of specialists to verify or to refute the 
authors’ assertions from many angles (e.g. methodology, geographical validity, data 
reliability). Such a broad evaluation of new propositions is simply not feasible in the case of a 
journal article or a conference paper, where only one assertion or hypothesis is made (“One 
idea, one paper”) and there is simply no place to discuss the earlier, rival theories except of 
those which were published in the same or similar journals during the last 3-4 years. 
The book of S&G certainly meets these sophisticated requirements.  Nearly all the 17 
substantive chapters are enriched with appendices, in which they spell out the simply 
formulated take-home message of the given chapter by using a formal model.  What is even 
more valuable (and rare), the last part of the book (Chapters 18-22 and the Afterword) the 
living giants of the economic profession, such as Phillipe Aghion, Robert Solow and Kenneth 
J. Arrow are expressing their opinion on the main tenets of the S&G hypothesis.  
There is no doubt that S&G set for themselves an extraordinary ambitious task.  In our 
reading, their aim was to come out with a landmark book and a persuading, unique policy 
doctrine at par with the Communist Manifesto (1844) of the young Marx and Engels, the 
Non-communist Manifesto of W.W. Rostow (1960), an economic history account of the 
modern world economy.  As the full title of S&G’s book indicates, the authors try to build a 
new conceptual model of growth, development and social progress.  
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Authoring a thick book like this comes with a trade-off.  It takes a lot of time.  As S&G 
explain the book’s main idea was born at 2008 conference celebrating the work of K. J. Arrow 
in general and his “learning-by-doing” growth explanation in particular.  Those were very 
different times from the present Trump-era for reasons we shall explain later.   If the S&G 
book had been drafted today, it would have been a very different book in many ways.   
II. THE STARTING POINT OF THE S&G HYPOTHESIS AND ITS 
CONSTRUCTION 
The concept of “learning society” is known in the scholarly literature for almost 50 years.1  
Among the international organizations, it was first embraced by the OECD (2000), as a key to 
a nation’s economic development.  The idea was subsequently taken further by the UNESCO 
stating that that education should extend beyond formal learning (in schools, universities 
etc.) and continue until the end of life (“lifelong learning”). 
But this is not the point, where S&G starts the presentation of their hypothesis.  They 
start their attempt to re-formulate the underlying mechanisms of economic development 
with the rejection of the mainstream, neoclassical growth model, the Cobb-Douglas 
production function, the famous Y = A(Kα L1-α) equation, the Solow model and the Golden 
Rule of Edmund Phelps, because this family of models assume that technological change is 
an exogenous factor in the model.    This criticism, as S&G readily acknowledges many times 
in the book, is not original.  It is derived from Arrow (1962), where the concept of learning 
by doing, as the endogenous driver of labour productivity growth had been first 
introduced.  In fact, the idea itself can be traced back to Adam Smith.   It was the great 
Scottish philosopher who first realized that rise of labour productivity is primarily the 
consequence of the division of labour which in turn leads to “the increase of dexterity in every 
particular workman” as a by-product of rising volume of production.  When a cobbler makes 
a boot, the hairdresser cuts a client’s hair through practicing of his profession he himself 
becomes better and more productive all the time.  This is all true, even if the cobbler or the 
hairdresser does not invent anything new, but simply applies and practices the knowhow 
invented and introduced by others.   Thus rising productivity is achieved through practice, 
self-perfection and minor innovations without adding workers or investing significant 
amounts of capital. 
According to S&G, information dissemination and absorption is much more important for 
social progress than information creation (p.490).  And indeed, if we glance through the 
                                                        
1 See e.g. Hutchins (1970), Schön (1973), Husén (1986) and Hughes – Tight (1995) among the 
English language works published before the millennium.  More references can be found in 
Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Learning_society), accessed on 30 August, 2017. 
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countries of the world, it is not difficult to observe that productivity differences within one 
country and/or within a single industry of the same country are quire considerable.  Lewis 
(2004) empirical study based on the collective effort of the research staff of McKinsey Global 
Institute is full of such examples.  At the end of the 1990s, labour productivity in the 
Japanese retail trade sector was not more than half of the comparable US figure, while the 
successful Japanese car manufacturing firms – like Toyota – surpassed in labour productivity 
their US competitors by a margin of 30 per cent.  Labour productivity in housing 
construction varied even more.
2
 
As a generalization of the learning-by doing theory, the S&G hypothesis is built on four 
new propositions:  
(i)  growth has more to do with learning than with allocative efficiency; 
(ii) the presumption that all firms are efficient is false, the majority of firms are always 
operating below their efficiency frontiers, whether in the United States or elsewhere; 
(iii) this “knowledge gap” between the potential maximum and the actual average within a 
country or within a given industry is in itself a source of rent; 
(iv) if there are many knowledge gaps, countries can be trapped in a low-level equilibrium 
(low rate of productivity growth) even in the medium- or long-term.
3
  
S&G return several times in the book to this fundamental criticism of the neoclassical 
mainstream.  They underscore many times, quite correctly though in our opinion, that in the 
advanced economies, increasing return to scale prevail most of time (instead of the text-book 
assumption of constant return to scale), and therefore the neoclassical equilibrium concept 
loses its validity right from the outset. 
The thinking of S&G goes as follows (FIGURE 1).  
                                                        
2 The book drew on extensive microeconomic studies of 13 countries over 12 years conducted by the 
Institute staff and invited world-class university professors, like Robert Solow himself.  See also fn. 
9. 
3 For the first authentic formulation of the S&G hypothesis, see Greenwald – Stiglitz (2006). 
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FIGURE 1 
 The logic of the Stiglitz – Greenwald hypothesis 
  
The new 
function 
of the 
state in 
infant 
econo-
mies:
the direct 
control of 
free trade, 
and the 
cross-
border flow 
of capital/ 
labour, etc.
in order to 
boost 
learning 
and 
innovation 
locally.
Innovation 
has vital 
external 
spillover 
effects, 
because
the 
whole 
society 
learns 
from the 
fruits of 
innova-
tion. 
 
     
 
Source: Author’s own presentation. 
 
Why should the state assume “new” roles?   According to S&G, the most important 
impediment of worldwide, lasting and equitable growth is that the globalized world economy 
has been continuously expanding the gap between social and individual returns 
everywhere.  Knowledge is a public good and absent government intervention it is 
undersupplied by utility maximising firms and/or individuals.
4
  Unlimited free trade, the 
cross-border flow of capital and labour, the mechanism of freely floating exchange rates, the 
liberalization of financial markets
5
 and the harsh protection of intellectual property rights 
(essentially the entire list of the Washington consensus, Williamson, 1990, 2008) are all 
problematic, because in the less developed economies – i.e. practically in all countries, except 
                                                        
4 Although S&G fail to mention, there is nothing new in this proposition, either.  Enhancing the 
Marshallian concept of externalities, Marshall’s favourite disciple Arthur Pigou (1920) had stated 
exactly the same: „self-interest will not (…) tend to make the national dividend a maximum” (Part 
II, Chapter IX).  In the original Arrow paper the same proposition is made, as well.  The competitive 
solution is different from the societal optimum solution, because “learning means that an act of 
investment benefits future investors, but this benefit is not paid for by the market” (op.cit. p. 168). 
5 Exposing their criticism over this issue, S&G are going quite far in the direction of populism, when 
they refer to „speculative businesses” and conclude that „in certain cases it is more efficient, if the 
state implements the allocation of capital investment itself” (op.cit. pp. 410-411).   
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the US – the overwhelming American productivity superiority prevents the local engineers, 
workers and business managers to learn and to innovate.  Under such a regime to conduct 
research is bound to fail businesswise.   But without continuous learning and innovation 
there is no opportunity to grow and develop.  From the point of view of the developing 
countries – or using S&G’s terms: infant industries and infant economies – it is more 
promising to restrict competition and protect the entire home economy rather than entering 
into an open competition with the more advanced economies.  This is the bottom line of the 
S&G hypothesis. 
According to Stiglitz and Greenwald, infant economies have two good reasons to protect 
their own domestic markets and to support the national companies’ learning and research 
possibilities: (i) the countries and the domestic firms learn directly from the production 
process as the learning-by-doing theory suggests; (ii) the newly acquired knowledge always 
has significant, dynamic spill-over effects (or positive externalities).  As an example of the 
spill-over effect S&G mention several examples, such as technological innovations in the 
manufacturing sector where a good idea of one firm can be applied later by other firms of 
another industry, or organizational innovations, such as the “just-in-time” stock management 
technique which can be applied across industries, once the necessary organizational skills 
and disciplines are learned by a relatively large pool of managers (p. 65). 
In the real world, however, when we return to the previously mentioned example of the 
cobbler, the problem is that once it was found out how to produce good quality, inexpensive 
boots in the US, firms in other countries will never be able to compete with the industry-
leader US cobbler.   According to the S&G hypothesis, this is a major problem not because all 
other countries will find it more economic to import boots from the US, but because the 
infant economies will never learn how to make boots.  Furthermore, once a boot factory in a 
developing country starts its operation despite the poor chances of success, there is a high 
likelihood that it will lose out in a free competition and goes bankrupt.  Then the already 
acquired “new knowledge” will be wasted (p. 491) and the spill-over effects will cease to drive 
the other segments of the economy forward.  According to S&G, their theory is valid 
historically as well.  “the fact that some countries and firms have ‘learned how to learn’ helps 
explain why the last two centuries have seen such remarkable increases in standards of living, 
in comparison to the millennia that preceded them, which were marked by stagnation” (p. 
373).  In short: the secret of development is learning and learning to learn.
6
 
                                                        
6 The concept of “learning to learn” was originally developed in Stiglitz (1987). 
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III. CHALLENGING THE S&G HYPOTHESIS 
This critique of the neoclassical growth model is not new.  Many decades ago similar 
observation had been formulated by Nicholas Kaldor (1966) who in turn relied on Young 
(1928).  In Kaldor’s own words, Young’s paper convinced him that “the main function of 
markets is to transmit impulses to economic change, and thereby create more resources 
through enlarging the scope for specialisation and the division of labour – rather than to 
secure an optimum allocation of a given quantum of resources” (Kaldor 1978, italics in the 
original), as the traditional school claimed in line with the Walrasian approach.
7
  In fact, as a 
student of Allyn Young, Kaldor had been entirely convinced from the 1930s onwards that 
increasing returns arising from, inter alia, the indivisibility of many types of physical capital 
was crucial only in the manufacturing sector. He believed that other sectors such as 
agriculture and the service sectors resembled more the textbooks’ constant returns to scale 
model.  Since then, however, the world has changed.  The share of manufacturing in total 
output fell back in the advanced economies, while the possibilities to cut unit costs through 
the expansion of output became highly visible in other sectors of the economy.  Therefore, 
without any reference to Kaldor’s somewhat outdated assertion, in the S&G approach the 
terms like “industry” or “industrial policy” are used in a wider sense and meant to be applied 
not only in manufacturing as it was widely held in the first half of the 20th century, but in 
agriculture, in research and development and – most importantly –, in the service sector as 
well (pp. 22-23). 
To whom the book’s message is addressed?  At this point, some of the readers of the 
present paper might start to protest and raise objections.  First, they can object that it has 
been argued already for more than 200 years by scholars of the economic profession that free 
trade is not desirable for developing countries and new (“infant”) industries.  The most 
important example was the case of the United States of America.  Alexander Hamilton, one of 
the founding fathers, who served his newly born country as Secretary of the Treasury 
between 1789 and 1795, became renowned as an opponent of free trade and as supporter of 
protectionism.  It is also common knowledge that Hamilton’s views influenced the German 
Friedrich List (1843) who became the main proponent of economic protectionism on the 
European continent a generation later.  Second, speaking for protectionism and against free 
trade means something very different today than before President Trump appeared at the 
scene of international politics. Donald Trump as a presidential candidate and later as sworn-
in president has been arguing for about two years that it is the US to which free trade is 
harmful, while the developing countries like China, Mexico or India free trade is unfairly 
                                                        
7 Mihalyi (2017). 
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advantageous.   How come?  How can be both statements – i.e. the S&G hypothesis and 
President Trump’s assertion – true simultaneously?  Several prominent American trade 
specialists have already expressed their doubts about what President Trump asserts.
8
   
The readers of the present paper might also pose a question by paraphrasing 
Hemingway’s famous novel, For Whom the Bell Tolls.   What is the basis for S&G to classify 
China, Egypt or Hungary as infant economies?  To whom the authors direct their policy 
recommendations? To the poorest countries of Africa, the 10 new Member States of the 
European Union, to Russia or China, to Greece or Italy, as the laggard countries in the EU?    
In the book, there is no answer to this critically important clarifying question.  What is even 
more troublesome, the authors end the book by saying that industrial policies and 
government interventions in trade are desirable and they may even be a permanent part of 
economic policy in the most advanced countries and not just in the early part of the 
convergence period of an ambitious infant economy (p. 474). 
There is another far-reaching point of ambiguity.  If we look from close, the true content 
of dynamic externalities generated by the learning process, we run into logical contradictions.   
Still sticking to the already used cobble example, if a newly established boot factory goes 
bankrupt by facing too strong competition from abroad, there is still a possibility of 
preserving the fruits of learning.  The engineers and the workers who lose their jobs might 
find similar employment opportunities in other firms, the freely acquired knowledge of the 
cobbler’s suppliers can also keep this knowledge.  
Honestly speaking, the S&G hypothesis is not convincing at all and the solicited 
commentators of the volume (Aghion, Solow and Arrow himself) did not hide very much 
their own reservations, either.  Stiglitz and Greenwald pretend as if they did not know 
1. … that the essence of the capitalist system is rivalry.  There are always winners and losers 
in a competitive environment (Lavoine, 1985).  Only in the world of Utopia can we think of 
countries displaying the same level of economic development and the closure of the 
knowledge gap. 
2. … that market competition is the strongest driver of innovation, even if there are well-
known situations when limited competition is actually hampering innovation (e.g. the rise of 
monopolies).  
3. … the variation of productivity among firms operating on the same market is not caused by 
a failure in learning.   This is the result of better management
9
, the power of the increasing 
                                                        
8 Nordhaus (2017), Dairuch et al. (2016). 
9 This point was actually raised in the contribution of Robert Solow in Chapter 21.  He directly 
referred to the empirical findings of Lewis (2004) in which he was one of the main research 
contributors.   The key finding of the research was that the lower quality of management had not 
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return to scale and the natural monopoly situations arising from it.  In other cases, better 
performance and higher productivity is simply a matter of luck.  It doesn’t make much sense 
to say that Facebook is successful because its managers “learned how to learn”, while Nokia is 
less competitive because its business leaders were bad “pupils”.  
4. … the 75 thousand employees who lose their jobs on every working day in the American 
economy are not bad “learners” either.  They get fired because the structure of the economy is 
constantly changing. Certain industries created new jobs for decades (e.g. retail trade, 
publishing, etc.), but after some fundamental shifts in technology, the very same industries 
started to shed labour.
10
 
5. … that rent-seeking and corruption are more important snags in the developing countries 
than in the advanced ones.   Therefore, centrally determined industrial policies carry with 
them an intrinsic risk.  If governments assume the power to select the winners, the industries 
and firms which “merit” protection, the risk of state capturing might arise, and in this way 
industrial policies become the hotbed of corruption.
11
       
Several contradictions arise from the fact that two authors of the Learning Society are 
Americans; therefore the book was chiefly addressed to the American readership.  Quite 
understandably, they tried to phrase their ideas in a way which is understandable and 
attractive for Americans.  It is a widely held opinion that the American educational system is 
disgracefully feeble, therefore emphasising the importance of learning is a popular 
proposition for every segment of the American society.  The upper middle class and the 
middle class are happy to read about this, because these elites are convinced that they 
merited their relatively privileged social position through successful education (Reeves, 
2017).  The lower level classes also like to read of the importance of education, because they 
expect from the government to spend more on the education of their children. 
As we purported already, much of what S&G call learning is partly or entirely something 
else.  There are at least five different meanings of “learning” in the book. 
a. Often the term’s true meaning in the given context is adjustment (p. 375).  Firms always try 
to adjust to the changing market conditions.  Sometimes successfully, other times 
unsuccessfully.  Behind the failure the retrospective analysis usually identifies managerial 
mistakes, ill-judgement or slow reaction. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
much to do with learning, knowledge or competence.  The cross-country comparisons showed that 
it was caused „by the weakness of competitive pressure, and the most important obstacle to 
competitive pressure was formal or informal protection. Firms and industries exposed to 
competition from best practice were driven toward best practice” (op.cit. pp 501-502).  
10 Krugman (2016). 
11 This argument, which is probably trivial for readers in the post-communist countries, was 
mentioned in the contribution of Phillippe Aghion (p. 496).   Together with Ivan Szelényi, the 
present author came to similar conclusions in Mihalyi – Szelényi (2017). 
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b. Industrialization in the lagging, catching-up countries is usually based on emulation.  
Competitiveness at the level of firms – apart from the cutting-edge players – must mean the 
adoption of the best existing technologies.  This was the quintessence of the successful 
industrialization of the Soviet Union in the middle of the 20th century and later in Japan and 
South Korea.  
c. Few growth specialists or economic historians would question the importance of acquiring 
basic cognitive skills, like reading, writing, arithmetic, etc.  There is a huge literature 
asserting that economic development is correlated with formal education (schooling), 
especially with the advancement of primary education. 
d. Since Max Weber’s analysis of the Protestant values, there has been a broad agreement 
that non-cognitive (cultural or soft) skills are also indispensable for growth.  Sometimes 
these skills are part and parcel of the local, traditional culture (e.g. Protestant ethic, 
Confucianism), in other cases these skills need to be “imported” and disseminated by the 
educational system, religious organizations, the media, etc.  The dissemination of English as 
a foreign language and the Anglo-Saxon cultural values are good recent example in Eastern 
Europe. The modernization of Russia under Peter the Great (1682-1696) and Japan during 
the Meiji period (1868-1912) worked with similar policy tools.  Such implantations are almost 
impossible to carry out effectively without some kind of government commitment, although 
today much of it happens through the unstoppable use of the internet and mobile phone 
applications, even if the incumbent governments don’t like it or try to stop it.  
It is difficult to understand for the non-American readers of the book, why the authors 
didn’t even try to tackle the question of American technological supremacy head on.  
Admittedly, the US has been the most advanced and most productive economy for about 
century, and its advantage has only increased since the onset of the international financial 
crisis of 2008 vis-à-vis Western Europe.  But how can be the US economy so effective in spite 
of its allegedly poor quality of its educational system?   The answer is straightforward.  In the 
American value system, the capacity to trade has never played such an important role as in 
other times or other places, like in the ancient Athens, the northern states of Europe in the 
Middle Ages (the so-called Hanseatic cities) or in the Middle East.  Perhaps this is the 
explanation of the fact that the “skills to trade” are not mentioned at all in this book.  But 
America as a whole, a country of immigrants does have an infinite wealth of trading skills 
incorporated in Asian and Latin American immigrants’ businesses.  The ten millions working 
in the trade and service sector don’t need to learn in school how to trade.  They bring this 
knowledge from home.    
It is equally inconceivable how come that the two authors did not take into consideration 
that the asymmetric limitation of free trade and or the administrative manipulation of the 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
exchange rate are not real options for the infant economies.  They don’t have enough power.   
It is very difficult to speak openly like this: “We would like to export freely, but we restrict the 
imports.  We keep the value of our currency low, but you should allow your currency to freely 
fluctuate.”  Using double standards can be one element in the tool box of a powerful country.  
As many examples of the 20th century showed, the US could make pressure on other 
countries to open their market for US goods, while the US markets remained closed for the 
partner country.  But this is not a viable strategy for converging countries, except for the very 
large ones like China or India.
12
 
While the authors correctly pointed out more than one times in the book that certain 
conservative societies are purposely built on the strategy of no-change (p. 96).  But they fail 
to draw the conclusion from this, namely that in such cases what is missing is not “learning” 
or “the capacity to learn”, but those specific values which are required to catch-up with the 
more advanced countries.  In more difficult cases, the majority of people in such conservative 
countries are honestly and deeply convinced that it is in their country’s interest to defend the 
“old” values.   
Finally, an author from a post-socialist economy can only regret that S&G do not even 
mention the bitter experiences of the large and small former socialist countries, such as the 
Soviet Union or Hungary, and the military dictatorships in Latin America which in many 
ways were similar to the planned economies.  Dozens of such countries pursued protectionist 
policies for decades in the 20th century.  But their overall growth performance was dismal.   
These countries failed to catch-up with their international competitors, as long as they 
pursued such policies. 
At the personal level this is understandable.  Professor Stiglitz and Greenwald do not have 
personal experience with such regimes, they don’t have the gut feelings how centralized, 
autocratic regimes function.  But the academic literature provides ample of evidences.  
Outside of the United States there are very few good examples proving that state-initiated 
trade restriction and state-sponsored industrial research – which is an important part of the 
“learning society” model - lead to expected results, to sustainable increase of competitiveness.  
Perhaps, the case of Japan and South Korea can be cited as suitable examples.  If, in the case 
                                                        
12 Robert Solow pointed out this contradiction, and – in an extremely polite way - made a devastating 
counter- argument.  It is true that for an infant economy it is of vital importance to direct its 
products toward export markets in order to exploit the advantages arising from scale economies.  
Exporting is also very important to maintain and improve the quality of its products and services 
under the pressure of the high requirements of the foreign buyers.   At the same time, however, it 
follows from the S&G hypothesis that the infant country should protect its own domestic markets 
from foreign competitors.  One can imagine tolerance for the protection of an infant industry here 
and another there; but an overarching protection for an entire infant economy would be a harder 
sell (op. cit. p.501).  
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of China, state-supported industrial research brings significant returns to the country, which 
is quite unlikely, this is probably due to huge size of its economy.
13
 
IV. A BETTER THEORY OF “LEARNING BY DOING” 
Even among Hungarian economists of the young generation, there are only few who read and 
remember the works of Ferenc Jánossy (1914-1997), a Hungarian economist of great 
originality.
14
  This is a pity, because much of the quintessence of the S&G book sounds very 
similar to Jánossy’s thoughts developed during the 1960s.  In our opinion Jánossy put 
forward a more convincing endogenous growth theory than the S&G concept. 
First of all, he interpreted learning as a qualitative change rather than a quantitative 
process: “man’s individual knowledge today is not necessarily greater than yesterday’s, but 
mainly of a different kind” (Jánossy, 1971. p. 205).   This is very much different from Arrow’s 
starting point (“knowledge is growing in time”15 ) which has been taken over uncritically by 
S&G.  If learning means a qualitative change, there is no such thing as a “knowledge gap” that 
separates infant economies from the more developed countries (as S&G claimed on p. 481).  
Every child who grew up on the enchanting Indian stories of James F. Cooper or Karl May 
knows that the life of Native Americans required all sorts of knowledge (horse-riding, 
hunting, making fire, shooting of arrows, etc.) which were necessary to survive in that 
environment.  Their knowledge, of course, was immeasurably different from the knowledge 
of modern American farmers growing wheat in the State of Iowa, or a banker working on 
Wall Street.    
The concept of “learning by doing” had been identified by Jánossy independently from 
Arrow, and perhaps his own metaphor (learning from the machine) was more illuminating 
than that of Arrow.  As Jánossy wrote “cutting can only be learned at a lathe, crushing at a 
milling machine, and driving at the wheel of the car.  (…) This transfer of knowledge through 
the means of production is of particular interest (…) because this is precisely what causes the 
misleading impression that perfection of machinery is the primary factor of economic 
development” (op. cit. p. 209).  Due to this important link, there is no real substitution 
                                                        
13 According to latest available data, China’s  R&D in 2013 was equal to the money United States 
spent in 2005 (Veuglers, 2017). 
14 Ferenc Jánossy grew up in Germany, worked and studied engineering in the Soviet Union between 
1933-46, before he returned to his native Hungary. German was his first language therefore 
everything he wrote in German was subsequently translated into Hungarian.  His most important 
book, The End of the Economic Miracle. Appearance and Reality in Economic Development, was 
simultaneously published in German and Hungarian in 1966.  The English translation, used in the 
present paper, came out in 1971.     
15 See Arrow’s clear statement in the first paragraph of his 1962 paper (op.cit. p. 155).  
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between capital (C) and labour (L).  Both of them are needed – simultaneously at a given 
point of historical time and in more or less fixed proportions.
16
 
In several of his writings, Jánossy discussed the ways and means how these fixed 
proportions were often purposely distorted by government policies.  One important example 
is, when state-controlled industrialization leads to loss making investments and then the 
government tries to impose limits on other market participants to protect the newly created 
factories.  This may makes sense, concludes Jánossy similarly to S&G, if and when the loss-
making investment helps significantly the formation of the working force in the enterprise 
concerned.  The example of the Soviet industrialization drive in the 1930s proves that such 
policies are sustainable for quite a time.  But there are two uncomfortable by-products of 
policies based on the presumption that allocative efficiency doesn’t count.   Firstly, to 
maintain such a system, the state needs a large and brutal state apparatus, because these 
loss-making investments are financed at the detriment of consumption.  With the benefit of 
hindsight, it is very likely that the development of Russia would have been faster than it was, 
if the market system had maintained all along the 70 years of socialist planning.   Secondly, 
the forced investment drive – at least in Soviet or Chinese cases - led to a slow growth of 
consumption, which in turn slowed down the “learning” of the labour force.  Widespread 
knowledge of driving supposes private ownership of passenger cars, clean working hands the 
existence of bathrooms at home, the general knowledge of foreign languages cannot be 
imagined without mass tourism, etc . 
Jánossy, who spent many years in the Hungarian Planning Office, warned his 
contemporary socialist planners not to try to accelerate economic growth through radically 
increased research and development (R&Đ) expenditures, either. Although it is not easy to 
comprehend at first hearing, innovation, the output of research does not generate welfare 
directly.   Innovation is merely a “recipe” which shows how the structure of production needs 
to be modified in order to increase the productivity of labour (op. cit. p. 117).   Whether the 
conditions of implementing the necessary restructuring of production are present or not in a 
given country and a given industry, that depends on the quality of the labour force at large, 
and not of the quality of the researchers.   It doesn’t help if the R&D activity runs much ahead 
of the quality of the labour force.  If this happens, it leads to massive societal waste, only.    
As it was shown above, the broader meaning of learning in the S&G concept included 
emulation, the copying of technologies of the more advanced countries.  There is nothing 
wrong with this. Although in theory, the possibility of a revolutionary innovation being born 
in an infant economy cannot be excluded, nevertheless the experience of the past two 
                                                        
16 This is very different from Arrow’s original approach, where the cumulative production of capital 
goods is used as a proxy for workers’ experience – i.e. for learning. 
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centuries showed that all pioneering innovations came from the most advanced countries like 
Britain, Germany and the US.  In his most recent book, János Kornai (2014) compiled a list 
of 111 innovations of great significance and proved that indeed only the most advanced 
countries are capable to convert inventions to innovation and organize the large-scale 
manufacturing of the new product in a commercially viable way (op. cit. pp. 5-18).   There are 
few exceptions to this rule.  The inventor of the ball pen lived in Argentina, Nescafe is a Swiss 
product, the software behind Skype was developed in Estonia, but none of these innovations 
had a major macroeconomic impact on the countries where these exceptional technological 
attainments were achieved. 
Before anybody falls in love with the “Learning Society” hypothesis, it is worth recalling 
the warning of Jánossy (1969) who introduced the concept of “quasi-development”.  This 
is directly linked to emulation or copying.  As he argued 50 years ago, when a country tries to 
accelerate economic growth in general and the development of manufacturing industry with 
protectionist trade policies and the artificial manipulation of the exchange rate etc., there is a 
danger that the emulation will be successful only in statistical sense.   The volume of 
production will increase, but the quality of goods coming off from the conveyor belts of the 
newly created factories will be hopelessly inferior to the products of the advanced market 
economies.  Many socialist countries have gone through this bitter experience.  Perhaps the 
most telling illustration to this scheme is the fate of the Soviet Lada passenger cars produced 
during the 1970s and 1980s, originally copied after a 1966 model of the Italian car 
manufacturer, FIAT.  Millions of such cars were manufactured, but they were outmoded from 
Day One onwards, and the factory made financial losses on the Western exports of these cars.  
It follows from Jánossy’s development concept that economic growth cannot be 
accelerated by the forced expansion of schooling, either.  Let us illustrate his point with the 
help of the latest statistical data.
17
  The Polish – German comparison is telling.  According to 
standardised OECD data, the share of persons in the labour force with a tertiary education 
degree is exactly the same in both countries (28%), while the difference in productivity
18
 is 
more than 2.1 times higher in Germany.  We can take another, even more shocking example.   
In the 25-64 age group, 54% of the Russian workers had some kind of tertiary education, 
which is much higher than the corresponding American, Japanese or Israeli figures (all 
between 45-50%), let alone the comparable Danish figure (37%).  In terms of productivity, 
however, the American level is 2.5 times higher than in Russia.  Similar differences can be 
                                                        
17 Jánossy’s assertion born in the 1960s (that the dynamics of schooling does not help to explain the 
known facts about the rise of productivity across countries), has been later confirmed by many 
econometric studies.  See e.g. Pritchett (2006).  
18 Measured as output per hour worked in international US dollars (converted to 2016 price level 
with updated 2011 PPPs).  
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identified when the least educated population is compared.  The share of Hungarians in the 
labour force with no more than 8 years spent in school is just 1%, while in Portugal this 
indicator stands at 32%.  On the basis of this strikingly large difference, one would assume 
that the Hungarian economy must display higher productivity levels.  But the contrary is the 
case: output per hours worked is 10% higher in Portugal than in Hungary.
19
   
As another Hungarian economist – Polonyi (2010) – already noted this “over-education” 
is not a unique Hungarian phenomenon.  It holds for all the post-socialist countries that the 
population’s educational level is higher than in market economy countries with similar level 
of economic development.   Quite clearly, this over-education drive was – to a very great 
extent – driven by the absence of tuition-fees during the decades of socialism.  As Holló 
(1974) and Jánossy (1975) who worked together showed, the extensive growth strategy in 
general and in the educational sector in particular leads to quasi-development and over-
education, or simply waste – if we allow for ourselves to use such a brutal term. 
Resistance to change/learning.  At this point it is worthwhile to return to one of the 
shortcomings of the S&G hypothesis already mentioned above, namely that it does not pay 
sufficient attention to the natural inertia of societies and the conscious resistance to change. 
By using such a value-loaded, entirely positive term like “learning”, Stiglitz and Greenwald 
create a misleading sentiment in their readers: catching-up is easy.  Jánossy, however, 
showed with a very simple argumentation that economic progress is not easy at all, because 
people for good reasons from their own perspective resist.  “For if no great resistance would 
stand in the way of diffusion of new achievements and of greater labour productivity, there 
would be no people left who carry drinking water home in earthen vessels on their heads 
from the well, no nomad tents, and even no steam locomotives, the last specimens of which 
would already stand in museums next to waterwheels and hand looms” (op. cit. p.135).  Very 
often religious norms are the main obstacle, like the Islam sharia-law according to which girls 
should not be allowed to go to school.
20
  The traditional forms of Hinduism have similar 
negative impact on women’s education and employment. 
                                                        
19 The source of education and productivity data are 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EAG_NEAC   (downloaded on 30 August, 2017) 
and The Conference Board (2017), respectively.  All data refer to 2015.  
20 A 2017 Pew Research Center survey in 39 countries asked Muslims whether they want sharia law, a 
legal code based on the Quran and other Islamic scripture, to be the official law of the land in their 
country. Responses on this question varied widely. Nearly all Muslims in Afghanistan (99%) and 
most in Iraq (91%) and Pakistan (84%) support sharia law as official law.  But in other countries, 
especially in Eastern Europe and Central Asia – including Turkey (12%), Kazakhstan (10%) and 
Azerbaijan (8%) – relatively few favour the implementation of sharia law.  The variation in Africa is 
also large: 86% in Niger, but only 37 in Tanzania.  http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/08/09/muslims-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/, 
downloaded on 1 September 2017.  
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In other cases, as the authors of the third thick book, Acemoglu and Robinson 
convincingly demonstrated, the resistance comes from a small group of people or a minority 
group within the country controlling all political institutions and excluding others from 
decision-making, ownership rights, fair competition, etc.   
Without any oversimplification, we can assert that the speed of economic development is 
determined by two countervailing forces: inertia on the one hand, and the ambition to 
emulate the more advanced countries on the other.  The needs of consumers are to a large 
extent biologically determined. Everybody needs food, clothing medicine or communication.  
If and when this is possible, people would like to consume more from all this.   The 
international price competition (or globalization) continuously modifies these needs within 
certain biological limits; therefore new forms of consumption appear all the time (e.g. cell 
phone, discount airlines). As long as the use of mobile telephones was expensive, they were 
unreachable for the masses of the developing countries.  When prices started to fall, the very 
same consumers displayed massive demand for this type of service.  It is also true, of course, 
that the emulation of consumer needs are to a certain extent the product of conscious 
marketing and the unpredictable shifts of fashion.  The new trends emerging in the advanced 
countries exert influence on the less developed ones.  This nature of the emulation effect can 
be more easily detected on certain markets like music, films or sports. 
Convergence is difficult, because the pioneers learn, too.   With the introduction of the 
“knowledge gap” concept, which is inherently static, the S&G hypothesis creates a deceitful 
image about the future chances of infant economies to catch-up with the most advanced 
countries.  It is enough that well-meaning policy makers support learning and the spread of 
innovation in all possible ways.  By contrast, Jánossy had a very simple illustration which 
shows that – beyond the problem of resistance, analysed already above – the horrendous 
difficulty to catch-up with the most advanced countries lies in the fact that the most 
productive economies can continue to improve their performance all the time, and there is no 
intrinsic impediment blocking them to keep on innovating.  
In the Anglo-Saxon world, this phenomenon is known as the Red Queen Paradox, which 
is an often used metaphor in everyday life, in economics, in the theory of arms race, in 
evolutionary biology etc.  The Red Queen is a fictional character in Lewis Carroll's fantasy 
novella, Through the Looking-Glass. Talking to the real-world hero of the book, Alice, the 
Red Queen described her empire as a system, in which "It takes all the running you can do, to 
keep in the same place."  In narrow, economic terms this is the description of competition: if 
your competitors are moving ahead, you have to move faster, not to lose ground.  In broader 
evolutionary terms (Valen 1973), the message is: "For an evolutionary system, continuing 
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development is needed just in order to maintain its fitness relative to the systems it is co-
evolving with." 
The following model directly taken over from Jánossy’s book (op. cit. pp.128-131) 
illustrates the connection between the diffusion of innovations and the rise of productivity in 
time and space.   Let us assume that six shipwrecked sailors – A, B, C, D, E and F – go ashore 
on a Monday and start to catch turtles as the only source of food on an uninhabited island.  
After one day of hard work, each of them returns with 10 turtles.  Then sailor A racks his 
brain overnight and comes up with a trick, a kind of a turtle trap, with which he succeeds in 
doubling his catch on Tuesday.  He catches 20 turtles instead of 10, while the other five 
sailors achieve only the yield of the previous day. Thereafter, the innovation begins to spread.  
On Wednesday the trap is already used by sailor B, and on Thursday by sailors A, B and C as 
well.  On Friday, A succeeds in perfecting his method further, and thus catches 30 turtles, 
while B, C and D – still using Tuesday’s innovation – continue to get 20 each, while E and F, 
still using their hands only – catch 10 each.  The improved method find acceptance, too and is 
adopted by B on Saturday, while all the others remain content with Tuesday’s innovation, 
except for the most backward among them, F, who still hunts turtles without any tool.  The 
table below shows the yield of the six sailors for each sailor and each day. 
TABLE 1 
 The spread of innovation among according to Jánossy’s theory 
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A 10 20 20 20 30 30 
B 10 10 20 20 20 30 
C 10 10 10 20 20 20 
D 10 10 10 10 20 20 
E 10 10 10 10 10 20 
F 10 10 10 10 10 10 
 
Source: Jánossy (1971) p. 129.  
 
In order to make the course of the first and the second innovation – increasing the daily 
catch from 10 to 20 and then from 20 to 30 – the data in the table are presented in graphic 
form (FIGURE 2), too.  The figure is a representation, in a general sense, of productivity as a 
function of time and place. 
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FIGURE 2 
Transmission of the best practice, as an illustration of the diffusion  
process in general 
 
Source: Jánossy (1971) p. 129.  
 
The three dimensional figure has the advantage of showing both the increase of 
productivity in the course of time (e.g. threefold for sailor A from Monday to Saturday) and 
the growing variation of productivity for each day of the week (non-existent on Monday, quite 
significant on Saturday).  These two cross sections of time and sailors are shown as projected 
silhouettes.  The third projection, an aerial view shows the diffusion process itself – i.e. how 
fast the steps of productivity created by the inventions of sailor A were diffused.  The measure 
of diffusion at a given time is the number of sailors (workers, as we shall call them later) who 
have already adopted the innovation.  In this example the speed of diffusion is one worker 
per day.  Let us now leap from the six sailors to the entire population of the globe, and from 
the “developments” of one week to developments of several centuries; but we stay in the one-
product (turtles-only) world.   Let each sailor correspond to a country, his labour productivity 
to the average productivity in that country, and the week on the uninhabited island to world 
economic history over the past 200 years.   The increase in productivity of one country forms 
a cross section through time – this is the per capita growth of national income (or GDP).  On 
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the left hand side of Figure 1, the projected silhouette corresponds to the GDP growth of 
country A, while on the right-hand side we see (without projection) that in country F there 
was no GDP growth at all through the past 200 years.  The other projected silhouette shows 
the productivity of the six sailors on Saturday, or (in the generalized mode) all countries of 
the world in order of their stage of development after the transmission of the innovations.  
Country A is the most developed and country F is the least advanced one.   If we extend our 
time horizon, we can easily get the same result: only country A innovates and the rest grow as 
fast as they can emulate the leading edge technology.  
V. AT PRESENT TRADE PROTECTIONISM IS NOT LIKELY TO BE EMBRACED  
Piketty’s voluminous book was a totally unexpected and unparalleled commercial success.  As 
of end-2015, more than 2.1 million copies were sold (Goldhammer, 2017 p. 18.).  For many 
reasons the book Stiglitz and Greenwood is unlikely to get close to this achievement.   Among 
the reasons, I presume, the protectionist trade rhetoric of President Trump is by far the most 
important.  Any idea, which so closely remembers to Trump’s ideology, is bound to be 
rejected by the academic circles in the United States and the prestigious European university 
departments, as well.   It is widely known that there was a historical precedent, when a 
protectionist legislation had been enacted by the US Congress and signed to law by a 
president, but the consensus view today is that the so-called Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 
was – even according to Arrow – “a very destructive policy” (p. 508).   
The full, official title of the Act was already expressive: “An Act to provide revenue, to 
regulate commerce with foreign countries, to encourage the industries of the United States, to 
protect American labour, and for other purposes.”   When it was still debated in Congress, a 
petition was signed by 1,028 economists in the US asking President Hoover to veto the 
legislation. The legendary automobile executive Henry Ford spent an evening at the White 
House trying to convince Hoover to veto the bill, calling it "an economic stupidity."  J. P. 
Morgan's chief executive Thomas W. Lamont said he "almost went down on [his] knees to 
beg Herbert Hoover to veto the asinine Hawley-Smoot tariff."  Initially, Hoover himself 
opposed the bill and called it "vicious, extortionate, and obnoxious”, but eventually he yielded 
to influence from his own party and signed the bill.  The new tariff imposed an effective tax 
rate of 60% on more than 3,200 products and materials imported into the United States, 
quadrupling previous tariff rates on individual items, and thus raised the average tariff rate 
to 19.2%.   As it was feared, Canada and other countries raised their own tariffs in retaliation 
after the bill had become law.  Unemployment was at 8% in 1930 when the Smoot–Hawley 
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tariff was passed, but the new law failed to lower it. The rate jumped to 16% in 1931, and 25% 
in 1932–33.21   
Against the backdrop of such a history and the noisy trade protectionism of President 
Trump during the first year of his presidency, everything that had been proposed by Stiglitz 
and Greenwald in 2014 sounds totally differently today.  While the book’s main idea that 
learning can be a wonder weapon in the hand of enlightened, good-willing policy makers will 
continue to attract many supporters, the present academic environment will remain 
unsupportive to the policy proposals emanating from S&G’s interpretation of the “learning by 
doing” metaphor.  As long as President Trump is advocating trade restrictions, S&G’s 
suggestions pointing into the same direction will be hardly heard. 
VI. CONCLUSION    
This extended book review of Creating a Learning Society by Joseph Stiglitz and Bruce 
Greenwald (2014) made an attempt to show that the term “learning” in used in the book in 
such a broad sense that it became almost meaningless as the main driver of economic 
convergence.   The second major shortcoming of S&G is that they left in obscurity to whom 
their policy advices are addressed: to the very poor, infant economies, the unsuccessful 
countries or to every country which aspires to catch up with the world’s leading economy, the 
United States.  By using such a value-loaded, entirely positive term like “learning”, Stiglitz 
and Greenwald have created a misleading sentiment in their readers: catching-up is easy.   
The present paper, relying on the growth theory of a hardly known Hungarian economist, 
Ferenc Jánossy shows that convergence is not easy at all, because people for good reasons 
from their own perspective resist to changes. Furthermore, catching up is always difficult, 
because if your competitors are moving ahead, you have to move faster, just for not to lose 
ground.     
       
  
 
 
 
                                                        
21 The cited facts and figures are from Wikipedia 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smoot%E2%80%93Hawley_Tariff_Act), downloaded on 30 
August, 2017. 
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